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“The Framers guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power 
in booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copyrights 
only in ‘Authors.’”1
 
“Two Registers of Copyrights have observed that the 1976 revision of the 
Copyright Act represented a break with the two-hundred-year-old tradition 
that has identified copyright more closely with the publisher than with the 
author.”2
 
[1]  History repeats itself.  This is why we teach history and spend time 
studying it, in an effort to avoid repeating our mistakes.  An example of 
this old adage at work appears to be surfacing in modern American 
copyright law’s response to new copying and dissemination technologies.  
Although the statement of the two Registers of Copyrights presented 
                                                 
∗ Thomas A. Mitchell received his Juris Doctor from Notre Dame Law School in 2005 
and holds a B.B.A. in Management from Texas A&M University.  This Note is dedicated 
to Matt Arend, Elizabeth Gray, Bobby Jee, and Meredith Peterson; thank you all for 
helping me throughout my law school experience. 
1 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003). 
2 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001) (internal quotation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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above may have been correct in 1977,3 it appears that the opposite trend is 
taking place today – copyright is becoming more closely aligned with 
publishers.  The safeguards enacted to prevent publisher monopolization 
of the rights to copy and distribute creative works are increasingly 
neglected when determining the appropriate response of copyright to new 
technologies.  Recent bills, statutes, and court proceedings have all 
contributed to publishers’ ability to obtain those monopolies over new 
methods of copying and distributing.4  Thus, American copyright law now 
faces a fundamental question: do the lessons of history and the purposes 
underlying American copyright law require greater limits on the control 
given to publishers of creative works, either by stronger authors’ rights or 
weaker copyrights in general?  Or, are the public and authors best served 
by recognizing the derivative benefits which flow to them when the 
profitability of publishing is protected? 
 
[2]  To resolve this question, one must consider the intricate relationship 
between publishers, authors, and the public.  Publishers need authors to 
provide them with works to copy and distribute, and they need the public 
to purchase the copies.  Authors need publishers to make copies and 
disseminate their works and the public to create demand for those works.  
The public needs authors to create works and publishers to provide them 
with copies.  Each party involved in copyright’s incentive system relies 
upon the others, and each receives benefits when the others get benefits.  
However, each also has interests of its own.  Publishers are business that 
want to maximize their profits, so they want to give the least possible 
remuneration to authors (taking into account what is practical given the 
royalties offered by competitors and the desire to attract the author again 
in the future) and charge as much as possible for each copy to the public.  
Authors want to receive as much compensation for their work as possible, 
so they too want the highest possible price from the public, but they want 
high royalties and payments from publishers.  The public wants creative 
works at the lowest possible price, and therefore wants both publishers and 
authors to get less payment for each copy.  Each party has incentives to 
both promote and curtail the interests of the others.  Thus, the challenge of  
                                                 
3 See id. at 495-96 & n.3. 
4 For convenience, the term “publishers” will be used throughout this Note to refer to the 
publishing and distribution industries, including, in particular, book publishers and the 
music industry. 
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copyright law is to balance these conflicting interests while providing 
adequate incentives to each group.5
 
[3]  This Note will show that, despite the constitutional mandate to the 
contrary,6 current law has shifted the balance of copyright’s incentives too 
far in favor of publishers and away from authors and the public.7  This 
shift has occurred because of the relative concentration of publishers in 
comparison with the other groups,8  which provides publishers the ability 
to purchase copyright ownership from authors.9  This ownership, in turn, 
provides leverage over any new technology related to copying or 
distributing creative works.  Using this leverage, publishers work to either 
proscribe or control these new technologies.  In this way, publishers are 
able to maximize their own interests, while providing only the minimal 
incentives necessary to both authors and the public.  The balance shifts 
from one of equality between the three interested groups to one favoring 
publishers over the others.  This problem is further compounded by the 
effect of this shift on the new technologies and their creators.  Copyright 
                                                 
5 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 31 (rev. ed. 2003).  This challenge was even addressed by the Statute of Anne 
in 1710, which attempted to balance the interests of encouraging learning, the demands of 
publishers, the demands of authors, and the public interest.  GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 11-12 (2d ed. 2002). 
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Thomas A. Mitchell, Note, Undermining the 
Initial Allocation of Rights: Copyright versus Contract and the Burden of Proof, 27 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 525, 538 (2005). 
7 This discussion is a gross oversimplification of the incentive structure between authors, 
publishers, and the public.  This structure is incredibly complex and nuanced, as none of 
the three groups have just one set of incentives; for example, amongst authors, there are 
numerous categories that each have their own incentives – writers, composers, singers, 
actors, playwrights, etc.  Even within each of these groups, no two people will be 
motivated by the same exact desires and incentives.  For purposes of this Note, however, 
the general structure provided in the following paragraph will suffice to show the 
underlying problems and how the proposed solution would rectify them. 
8 See Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 44-
45 (2002) (“[A]n increasingly concentrated industry of publishers routinely own the 
copyright for a work outright and therefore have an incentive to lobby for ever-expanding 
copyright terms.”). 
9 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218 (1990) (“It not infrequently happens that the 
author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum.”) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909)); see also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 539-41 
(discussing the ability of publishers to require authors to transfer their entire copyrights 
before publication). 
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law must account not only for the existing players, but also for new 
authors and new types of works– such as creators of new inventions.  
When a new technology is prohibited in its infancy or controlled by 
publishers, both the authors of the technology and the public are harmed.10  
The American system of copyright law, however, was designed precisely 
to avoid these outcomes. 
 
[4]  To demonstrate why the balance of copyright rights is important and 
how to solve this problem and return copyright to an equilibrium point, 
this Note will proceed in three parts.  It will begin by exploring the origin 
of the concept of “copyrights” and the purpose, rationale, and 
development of American copyright law.  It will then focus on the current 
state of copyright law, which enables publishers to hold a monopoly over 
the copying and distribution of creative works.  Finally, it will present a 
solution to this problem: the creation of a new right in the bundle of 
copyrights for each new copying or dissemination technology created, and 
the vesting of the right in the original author of each work, not the 
copyright owner.11
 
II. ORIGIN OF “COPYRIGHTS” AND THE AMERICAN COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 
[5]  A proper understanding of the way copyright law should respond to 
the development of new technologies to maintain an appropriate balance 
between authors, publishers, and the public can only be achieved when 
considered through the lens of a full understanding and appreciation of the 
purpose(s) underlying copyrights.  This understanding, in turn, requires 
some background knowledge of how copyrights developed and how and in 
what context the American system of copyright was created.  To that end, 
this section will provide a brief overview of the origin of copyright law in 
England, of the Copyright Clause in the United States, and of the purpose 
behind American copyright law. 
 
                                                 
10 These authors are harmed because they lose control over, and potential remuneration 
from, their inventions.  The public is harmed because it loses the benefits the new 
technology provides.  Both are also harmed by the discouraging effect on creation and 
invention and the loss of systemic knowledge (new technologies generally build up and 
improve, or are inspired by, existing technologies). 
11 This solution will be provided in much greater detail in the final section.  See infra § 
IV. 
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A. The Origin of Copyrights 
[6]  Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in 143612 provided the 
original impetus for copyrights.  The printing press was brought to Great 
Britain in 1476, by William Caxton.13  At this point, a great proliferation 
in the number of books available in England began, along with a vast 
increase in the number of publishers.14  At the same time, however, there 
was a rise in the incidence of piracy.15  Unauthorized copies of books 
created a problem for legitimate publishers.16  In response, the Stationers’ 
Company, a guild for publishers, printers, bookbinders, and booksellers, 
began granting rights to individual publishers to make copies of certain 
manuscripts.17  At the same time, the Crown was attempting to enforce 
censorship of works antithetical to the Crown or to the established 
religion.18  To facilitate the enforcement of this censorship, the Crown in 
1538 licensed rights to make copies to certain publishers, who were then 
responsible for enforcing censorship.19  Later, in 1557, the Crown granted 
a charter to the Stationers’ Company, providing a monopoly on publishing 
and printing in Great Britain.20  Because the purpose motivating this 
charter was merely to enforce censorship, there was nothing within the 
grant to prevent the Stationers’ Company from enforcing its conferral of 
the rights to make copy (or copyrights) on individual publishers, and it 
was given the authority to do just that.21  Thus, the original purpose 
behind the first copyrights was to protect publishers, so they could keep 
                                                 
12 See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 9 (1980). 
13 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1968). 
14 See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 9. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 Id. at 11; JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE 28 (2002). 
18 See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 10. 
19 See id. at 11; DAVIES, supra note 5, at 10; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 23-24. 
20 See DAVIES, supra note 5, at 10; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 27-28; PLOMAN & 
HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 11. 
21 PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 11; cf. PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 21, 36 
(“[C]ensorship did aid private persons, publishers and printers, in developing copyright in 
their own interest with no interference from the courts and little from the government…. 
The Stationers’ Company was able to develop the concept of copyright because the 
government remained indifferent to the private ownership of copy.”). 
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the profits from piracy and enforce the censorship that was imposed by the 
Crown.22
 
B. Problems of Monopolization 
[7]  The initial system of copyright lasted for approximately 150 years.23  
The Crown allowed the licensing act to expire in 1694.  By providing too 
few copies of each work and charging exorbitant prices for each copy, the 
publishers had become monopolists.24  At this point, the Stationers’ 
Company (hereinafter “the Company”) still had the ability to grant rights 
to individual members as against other members, but it had no 
enforcement capability outside the courts.25  Piracy became rampant.26  
The Company attempted to regain its enforcement rights, but the House of 
Lords repeatedly denied these requests.27   
 
[8]  After these failures by the Company, it changed tactics,28  and began 
to press an authors’ rights theory of copyrights.29  The Company argued 
that without this protection, authors would suffer, because no one would 
pay authors for their manuscripts.30  In response to these efforts,31 the 
Statute of Anne, generally considered to be the first authors-rights 
statute,32 was created in 1710.33  
 
[9]  The Statute of Anne was entitled “An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies during the Times therein mentioned.”34  
Despite popular modern belief, the statute was not intended to protect 
authors, it was intended to prevent piracy without allowing publishers to 
                                                 
22 DAVIES, supra note 5, at 10. 
23 PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 11. 
24 See id. at 12; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 32-33. 
25 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 33. 
26 See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 12. 
27 Id. 
28 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 33. 
29 Id. at 34; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 13. 
30 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34. 
31 Id. 
32 PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 12. 
33 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); see also PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 43. 
34 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
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hold monopolies over works.35  This is demonstrated in several provisions 
of the statute.  The statute did not restrict the ability to hold copyrights to 
authors, it discussed piracy as printing copies of works “without the 
Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such” works,36 and granted 
rights to copy to authors or their “Assignee or Assignes.”37  At the same 
time, the intent to prevent piracy is clear from the grant of exclusive 
printing rights to the author or his beneficiary.38  The goal of preventing 
monopolies was achieved by limiting the duration of these rights, which 
had previously been infinite in duration.39  For books which had 
previously been printed, the owner of the printing rights was entitled to a 
continuation of rights to print the book for twenty-one years, and the 
author of any book not yet published, or his assignees, was entitled to the 
exclusive publishing rights to such book for fourteen years from initial 
publication.40  Another major limitation on the ability of a publisher to 
hold a monopoly on a work was the sole right granted exclusively to 
authors, not their assignees, after the initial fourteen year term expired.41  
The right to publish the work reverted to the author, provided that he was 
still living, for another fourteen year period.42  Finally, as an additional 
limitation on monopolization and a method of raising awareness of 
creative works and increasing access to those works, penalties were not 
enforceable unless the title of the book was “entered in the Register Book 
of the Company of Stationers.”43  Nine copies of each book also had to be 
provided for the use of certain libraries.44
 
[10]  At first the statute had very little effect on authors because the 
booksellers “simply insisted on having the copyright before they would 
consent to publish a work.”45  Furthermore, the successor to the 
Stationers’ Company, the Conger, did not give up on retaining its 
                                                 
35 DAVIES, supra note 5, at 13; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 143. 









45 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 152. 
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publishing monopoly.46  It owned the rights to numerous economically 
lucrative works, such as Shakespeare’s works, and did not want the 
copyright to fall into the public domain after twenty-one additional years, 
it wanted to keep the rights in perpetuity.47  If the Conger lost its exclusive 
right to publish these works, it would face competition from other 
publishers and the decreased profits which result from competition.48  
Therefore, the Conger continued to lobby the House of Lords to return its 
former rights.49  These pleas were denied.50  The Conger then tried a new 
strategy, based on a theory of common law rights of the author.51  This 
argument eventually led to the famous case of Donaldson v. Beckett.52
 
[11]  Prior to Donaldson v. Beckett,53 Millar v. Taylor54 had held in favor 
of the argument of the Conger, stating that there was a common law right 
of authors to copy their works which had survived the Statute of Anne.55  
This meant that publishers, who had acquired those rights from the 
authors, held perpetual control over the copyrights in those works.56  
Moreover, the Millar case expanded the rights included in a “copyright” 
from merely the publishing right to all rights in the work.57  This appears 
to have occurred from either an accident or a misunderstanding in the 
                                                 
46 Id. at 151. 
47 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 32; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 152; PLOMAN & 
HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 13. 
48 See Norman W. Hawker, Maximum Resale Maintenance under the Rule of Reason, 51 
BAYLOR L. REV. 441, 448 (1999) (“Competition tends to increase economic efficiency 
and lower prices.”); Nicolas Oettinger, In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust 
Litigation, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 325 (2001) (“Commentators often advance 
economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust laws. Free 
from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices, increases 
production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business dealing.”). 
49 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 153. 
50 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 158. 
51 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 35; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 158. 
52 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38. 
53 Id. 
54 Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).  
55 Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 36-37; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 168.   
56 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 37; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 168-69.  Interestingly, 
the argument that the rights were perpetual was created by the publishers and was clearly 
intended to benefit the publishers. 
57 See PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 169, 170-171. 
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case.58  At the time, the term “publish,” when used in conjunction with 
copyrights, referred to merely publishing rights, but the term “copy” 
referred to all rights in the work.59  The Millar court used the term “copy,” 
and not “publish,” in its decision, and therefore the common law 
copyrights recognized in the case subsumed all rights in a work.60  Thus, 
publishers who purchased an author’s copyright held all of the rights to the 
work under a common law copyright theory. 
 
[12]  Alexander Donaldson disagreed with this result and proceeded to 
publish the same work which had been at issue in Millar.61  The protection 
period established by the Statute of Anne had expired, so Donaldson 
argued that the work was unprotected and could be published by anyone.62  
Beckett, who had purchased Millar’s rights to the work, argued that the 
decision of the court in Millar was correct – the common law copyright 
endured in perpetuity.63  The chancery court in Donaldson v. Beckett held 
for Beckett, based on the previous case.64   
 
[13]  Donaldson appealed to the House of Lords, which held that the 
Statute of Anne displaced the common law rights, and the work was 
therefore free to be published by anyone.65  In fact, “the decision could 
hardly have been otherwise.  It was the only decision which would destroy 
the monopoly of the booksellers, and there is little question that the 
decision was directly aimed at that monopoly.”66  Therefore, the rights to 
publish works were controlled exclusively by the Statute of Anne, and 
these rights were of limited duration.67  Finally, and “[u]nfortunately, the 
decision does not seem to have been properly understood because of the 
confusion surrounding the author’s so-called common-law copyright.”68  
Although the House of Lords explicitly “spoke in terms of the right of 
                                                 
58 Id. at 173; cf. id. at 172 (“Yet, in the light of the earlier history of copyright, all of the 
opinions missed the basic point that copyright was essentially a publisher’s right.”). 
59 See id. at 173. 
60 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 173. 
61 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38. 
62 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 172. 
63 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38-39 
64 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38-39; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 172-73. 
65 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 39; PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 173-74. 
66 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 177-78. 
67 See id. at 175. 
68 Id. at 178. 
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‘printing and publishing for sale,’” and not in terms of copying or 
copyrights, the decision was interpreted, in light of the decision in Millar 
regarding common law copyrights, to apply to all rights in a work, not just 
the right to publish.69  Thus, although the court had intended to address 
only the publisher’s monopoly, it effectively determined the effect of the 
Statute of Anne on the entire bundle of rights which compose a copyright.  
Copyrights granted exclusive privileges to authors.  These rights could be 
transferred to publishers, but the rights were limited in important ways to 
prevent monopoly power from discouraging the creation of new works. 
 
C. American Copyright Law 
[14]  Approximately a decade later, twelve of the thirteen American 
colonies had enacted some form of a copyright statute.70  Most of these 
were based on the Statute of Anne.71  These statutes raised some 
interesting points of their own, however.  Eight of the statutes included 
preambles stating that the purpose of copyright “was to secure profits to 
the author; the reason for it was to encourage authors to produce and thus 
to improve learning; and the theory upon which it was based was that of 
the natural rights of the author.”72  A purpose of preventing monopoly is 
conspicuously absent from this list.  The concept, however, survived, 
because of the basis of the statutes in the Statute of Anne.73  Thus, the 
state statutes were predominantly authors’ rights statutes, but they limited 
the ability to gain monopoly power by including the limited duration 
aspect of their English predecessor. 
 
[15]  This was the backdrop against which the Framers of the Constitution 
developed the Copyright Clause.  The Clause states: “The Congress shall 
have the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”74  This provision 
provides the entire authority for the federal government to promulgate 
                                                 
69 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 151, 173, 175; see also PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra 
note 12, at 14. 
70 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 183-84; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 14. 
71 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 183; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 14. 
72 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 186. 
73 Id. at 184, 188-89. 
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
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copyright laws.  The purpose and intention of this provision sheds light on 
who was to benefit from copyright, how they were to benefit, and what 
copyright laws should and should not protect.  Therefore, the purpose and 
intent of this clause are important when attempting to determine how 
Congress, courts, and publishers should react to the development of new 
technologies. 
 
[16]  The way the Copyright Clause allocates and prioritizes incentives 
amongst authors, publishers, and the public informs the propriety of 
modern-day copyright statutes and protections.  This purpose has been 
extensively debated, with four prominent theories being asserted: “that 
copyright is to protect the author’s rights; that copyright is to promote 
learning; that copyright is to provide order in the book trade as a 
government grant; and that copyright is to prevent harmful monopoly.”75  
Each of these theories has some support, and each theory can find some 
historical basis during this period.76     However, the generally accepted 
understanding, that “the ultimate purpose of the Copyright Clause was to 
promote learning,”77 does not, by itself, tell us much about how to respond 
to new publication and dissemination technologies.   
 
[17]  The methods of achieving this purpose are more instructive – 
providing authors with incentives for their creative activities, and limiting 
those incentives by time and function (to activities which promote 
progress).78  Both of these constraints limit the formation of monopolies.79  
Giving rights to authors prevents monopolization by preventing the 
concentration of power in any one person, because any one author would 
only hold a limited number of copyrights, whereas a publisher can hold 
vast quantities of copyrights.  The limited duration of copyrights prevents 
monopolies because the copyright eventually falls into the public domain, 
so that anyone can freely use the work.  In fact, the Framers even 
                                                 
75 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 181; see also PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 
15. 
76 See PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 181; see also Thomas A. Mitchell, Note, Copyright, 
Congress, and Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too 
Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2121 (2004). 
77 Mitchell, supra note 76, at 2125; see also PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 193; PLOMAN 
& HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 16. 
78 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 194; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 16. 
79 PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 194. 
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discussed the concept of monopolies within the context of copyrights.80  
Jefferson was hesitant to grant even limited monopolies over creative 
works.  Madison, an advocate of copyrights, only promoted providing a 
limited monopoly to encourage authors to create, not plenary rights.81   
Thus, the ultimate beneficiary of the clause was to be the public, but the 
method of providing public benefits prevented monopolies by giving 
limited rights to authors. 
 
[18]   Finally, the inherent limitation on publisher monopolies is 
demonstrated by the Act of 1790,82 which was modeled after the Statute of 
Anne.83  The Act was entitled “An act for the encouragement of learning, 
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and 
proprietors of such copies, during the times mentioned therein.”84  The 
Act is entitled similarly to the Statute of Anne, and it contains many of the 
same restrictions and privileges as that statute, including a renewal 
provision.85  “In this way [regarding the renewal provision], Congress 
attempted to give the author a second chance to control and benefit from 
his work.”86  This provision, allowing the author to regain control of his 
work for a second term of copyright, actively prevents monopolization by 
the publisher – just as had been done in the Statute of Anne.87  Thus, 
history makes clear that copyrights, although not explicitly intended to 
prevent monopolies, effectively accomplished this result by establishing a 
structure that balanced the incentives awarded to publishers, authors, and 
the public.88  This structure and balancing system should be maintained, 
and the lessons provided by the early copyright system in England should 
                                                 
80  Mitchell, supra note 76, at 2122-23. 
81 Id. 
82 PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 16. 
83 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 CONG. CH. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790);  see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 232 n.8 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 1790 Act was patterned, in 
many ways, after the Statute of Anne enacted in England in 1710.”). 
84 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 CONG. CH. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
85 Compare Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.), with Copyright Act of 1790, 1 
CONG. CH. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
86 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218 (1990). 
87 See PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 197. 
88 See id. at 194-96; cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201 n.5 (“The Framers guarded against the 
future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by authorizing 
Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”). 
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not be forgotten.  Publishers should not even be permitted,89 let alone 
helped and encouraged, to procure monopoly power through prohibiting or 
acquiring control over newly invented copying and dissemination 
technologies. 
 
III. PUBLISHER PROTECTIONISM, CONTROL, AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 
“It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a 
publisher for a comparatively small sum.”90
 
“Much of the existing copyright code is difficult to describe as a device 
for providing incentives to create new works.”91
 
[19]  The history of copyright shows a system designed to limit monopoly 
power by granting authors rights over publishers and by limiting those 
rights.  History also shows, however, that this preference was not 
cultivated by authors or the public, but was created as a result of 
arguments proffered by publishers.  Thus, the underlying theory of 
American copyright law, even the rights afforded to authors and the 
public, developed as a result of a power struggle between established 
publishers and challenger publishers (often referred to as “pirates”).92   
 
[20]  Historically, challengers attempted to compete with the established 
publishers by printing the same works in cheaper copies, either through 
the same quality offered at lower price or by offering lower quality 
copies.93  The method created to prevent this struggle from resulting in 
agreements between the challenger and established publishers to divide 
the rights to remuneration from a work and reduce competition (a result 
                                                 
89 This does not mean that publishers should not enjoy profits from their efforts.  
Publishers should be able to obtain remuneration for the work they perform.  This 
compensation for services should be limited to compensation for what they do, however, 
and should not provide monopoly rents to them.  Profits should be balanced between 
publishers, authors, and the public, not distributed in the manner best seen fit by 
publishers. 
90 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 218 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 14 (1909)). 
91 Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 
(2004). 
92 See generally id. 
93 Id. at 293-95. 
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which would ultimately harm consumers with higher prices and fewer 
quantities of copies of works) was to give control of remuneration rights to 
authors and limit the ability to control a work by limiting the duration of 
the copyright (the source of control over the work).94  However, this 
solution was never totally effective, and the effectiveness it did have 
declined as publishers grew in power and size.  Thus, despite copyright 
law’s purpose of promoting progress and benefiting the public by 
rewarding authors (and therefore derivatively benefiting publishers), 
copyright law has continued to develop in reaction to struggles between 
established publishers and challengers, which normally arise with new 
technological advances.95  Worse yet, the effect of these reactionary 
copyright laws has been to allow publishers to gain monopoly power, and 
thereby to shift the status of copyright from a balance between authors, 
publishers, and the public, to a preference for publishers. 
 
A. The Power Struggle 
[21]  During the latter part of the nineteenth century and throughout the 
twentieth, a number of new technologies were invented relating to the 
business of publication and dissemination.96  These inventions improved 
copying and disseminating, by making it quicker, easier, or cheaper to 
perform one or both of these activities, or some combination thereof.97  
Technologies such as record players, radio, and cable television presented 
serious challenges to the incumbent industries (sheet music publishers, 
sheet music publishers and songwriters, and the broadcast industry, 
respectively),98  and incumbent industries reacted negatively to the 
upstarts.99  They accused the new competitors of piracy and sought 
protection.100  Each incumbent group argued that the interests of authors 
                                                 
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
95 Wu, supra note 91, at 292-325. 
96 See id. at 292.  Examples of this phenomenon include record players, cable television, 
online music distribution, VCR players, DVD players, and audiocassette players.  
Douglas Eberman, Popular Inventions - Everyday Household Items, Computers, 
Transportation and Navigation, Medicine, Entertainment, Sports, Music, Art., 
http://douglas7eberman.net/techistory.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
97 See, e.g., Wu, supra note 91, at 293. 
98 See id. at 297-312. 
99 See id.  The incumbent industries generally reacted by bringing lawsuits against these 
upstart companies.  
100 See id. 
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would only be protected if the challenger was prohibited or controlled by 
the incumbent – otherwise, authors would be prevented from receiving 
adequate compensation for their works.101  Furthermore, each incumbent 
feared that the challenger would destroy and displace its business.102  
They brought actions in courts, accusing the challenger of copyright 
infringement,103 and sought legislative protection from Congress.104  Each 
of these conflicts resulted in a statutory grant of licensing in the form of 
royalties.105  More importantly, each of these conflicts resulted in the 
incumbent industries successfully obtaining protection against challengers, 
by requiring the challenger to pay royalties to the incumbent, and thereby 
reducing competition from the challengers.106  In this way, the incumbent 
publishers leveraged their copyright ownership to obtain income from the 
new technology, and the new technology was allowed to develop.  
However, the challenger existed in relative harmony with the incumbent 
instead of inciting competition between the two potential publishers to 
obtain copyright ownership or licensing rights from authors, competition 
which would have allowed authors to drive up prices for their works. 
                                                 
101 See id. at 298-99, 305, 313. 
102 See  id. at 297-312. 
103 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Teleprompter Corp. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974), superseded by statute, Copyright 
Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), as recognized in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. 
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 641 (1984); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 
U.S. 390 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2000),  as recognized in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 641 (1984); Herbert 
v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 
U.S. 1 (1908); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th 
Cir. 1925); Alden-Rochell, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. 
Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901); Kennedy v. 
McTammany, 33 F. 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888); see generally Wu, supra note 91, at 301-
24. 
104 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (requiring license for making and distributing 
phonorecords); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (giving 
owners exclusive rights to their copyrighted works); see generally Wu, supra note 91. 
105 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (secondary transmissions by 
satellite); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (coin-operated phonorecord players); 17 
U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000) (sound recordings) 17 
U.S.C. § 111 (2000) (secondary transmissions and cable systems); United States v. Am. 
Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Wu, 
supra note 91, at 290-91. 
106 See Wu, supra note 91, at 325 (“Copyright cannot help creating the baseline for 
competition among disseminators.”). 
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B. Against Publisher Control: The Sony Case 
[22]  Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, publishing industries 
utilized this methodology to great success.  Nascent technologies were 
generally either stifled in their incipiency or were at least controlled to 
some extent by the incumbent publishers.  In addition, two judicial 
doctrines were created which made this process easier – contributory 
infringement and vicarious liability.107  These doctrines eased the burden 
on the incumbents by making the manufacturer or operator of new 
copying or distribution technologies liable for infringement activities of its 
consumers or users, thereby allowing the copyright owner to sue one 
party, the manufacturer or operator, rather than numerous parties, the 
directly infringing consumers.   
 
[23]  Contributory liability creates liability in a secondary infringer when 
three elements are present: “(1) direct infringement by a primary infringer, 
(2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution to the 
infringement.”108  Essentially, this doctrine imposes liability when the 
party either knew or reasonably should have known that infringing activity 
was occurring at a time when they had the ability to control or stop that 
infringing activity.109   
 
[24]  Vicarious liability also imposes liability for copyright infringement 
on parties who did not engage in direct infringement when three elements 
are present: “(1) direct infringement by a primary party, (2) a direct 
financial benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right and ability to supervise 
the infringers.”110  All of this changed, however, and the incumbent 
industries suffered a major setback, with the case of Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios.111
 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded by MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 
2764 (2005). 
108 Id. 
109 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). 
110 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164. 
111 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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[25]  In Sony, the claim was not novel: Sony had developed a new 
technology (the Betamax) which was capable of copying creative works, 
and members of the movie and television industries alleged that Sony was 
liable for copyright infringement.112  These industries claimed that the 
users of the VTR engaged in direct infringement, and that Sony was 
therefore liable under the doctrine of contributory infringement.113  The 
Supreme Court, however, was hesitant to deny the benefit of new 
technologies to non-infringing users merely to suppress infringing uses of 
those technologies.114  The Court rejected the contributory infringement 
argument, holding that Sony was not liable because (1) Sony could not 
control how the Betamax was used by consumers and (2) the Betamax was 
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”115  Thus, the Court rejected 
the attack on the Betamax and refused to allow the movie industry to gain 
any control over or prohibit it, because it could be used legitimately.  Even 
though Sony knew it was also used illegitimately, Sony had no way to stop 
the infringing uses. 
 
[26]  This decision dealt a blow to the movie industry (the incumbent 
publishers), because it meant that the industry could not go after Sony, the 
manufacturer of the new technology, but instead was forced to go after 
direct infringers, the consumers of its works.  The Sony decision appeared 
to impose significant burdens on the industry.  Because the industry could 
not extract payments from Sony, it would have to spend more resources 
prosecuting infringers, risked alienating its consumers by suing them, and 
faced competition in the market for producing copies of its works.  Jack 
Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America, 
voiced these feared effects of new technology when he told Congress that 
the VCR would destroy the movie industry.116  He even went so far as to 
say “the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public 
                                                 
112 Id. at 419-20. 
113 Id. at 420. 
114 See id. at 421, 431, 456. 
115 Id. at 456. 
116 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of  the Committee on the 
Judiciary House of Representatives on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 
5488, and H.R. 5705, 97th Cong. (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion 
Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
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as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”117  History has 
vindicated the Sony Court’s decision, as the VCR not only did not destroy 
the movie industry, but instead provided that industry with a source of 
revenue that surpassed the revenues from box office sales within a few 
years.118
 
C. The Attack on Sony and Re-establishment of Publisher Control 
1. Attacking Sony and the Rise of the Internet and the Digital Age 
[27]  Publishers have never been content with the Sony decision119 and 
have actively attempted to overturn the decision since it was handed 
down.120  These efforts were met with limited success for a number of 
years, including the narrowing of Sony by numerous other court 
decisions.121  Despite these efforts, though, the holding still retains 
                                                 
117 Id. 
118 An Examination of S. 2560, the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004: 
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(testimony of Gary J. Shapiro on behalf of the Consumer Electronics Association and the 
Home Recording Rights Coalition); Scott Huver, Are Hollywood Honchos Hiding Home 
Video Profits?, HOLLYWOOD.COM, Aug. 29, 2002, 
http://www.hollywood.com/news/detail/article/1113242 (discussing profits from home 
video and DVD sales as “often twice as big as box-office grosses”). 
119 See, e.g., Efforts to Curb Illegal Downloading Copyrighted Music: Hearing on S. 
2560 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Gary J. 
Shapiro, President, Consumer Electronics Association) (“S.2560 provides movie and 
recording interests with the head-on attack on Betamax that they have long sought.”). 
120 See id.; see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648-50 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom, Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, 
Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000); 
Adobe Sys. Inc. v. S. Software, Inc., No. C 95-20710 RMW(PVT), 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1941, at *26 n.16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998); Nationwide Educ. Dev. Corp. v. Rex 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 4957 (JFK), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5331, at *13 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1990). 
121 See  In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648-50 (7th Cir. 2003); Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 
F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 
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viability as good precedent.122  However, the creation and growth of the 
Internet and digital technology have spurred a renewed and more 
aggressive attack from the publishing industries. 
 
[28]  The combination of these two inventions, the Internet and digital 
technology, has made mass distribution of perfect copies of works 
possible, cheap, and efficient.123  Furthermore, these inventions make it 
feasible for individual users to engage in mass copying or distribution of 
creative works, rather than restricting these activities to rival publishers 
and challengers.124  This poses a serious problem to publishers because 
they receive no economic benefit from distribution or copying of works by 
consumers.  It is also a problem for authors, because it is difficult to 
enforce royalty payments against such a large number of potential 
distributors.  Finally, it presents a long term problem for the public. 
Although the public gets free copies of works in the short term, it 
decreases the incentives of both publishers and authors to create and 
provide new works, resulting in fewer available works in the future.  
However, for these inventions to be effective, there must be a 
manufacturer of digital copying equipment or an operator of an online 
distribution forum.125  To circumvent these problems and to avoid suing 
                                                                                                                         
F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
122 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (citing the Sony decision and relying on it as precedent), vacated and 
remanded by MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005) ("It is 
enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of 
Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be 
required."). 
123 See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 2115 n.2, 2116 n.3. 
124 See id. 
125 A centralized system, or at least a program that provides access to other users, is 
necessary so that users have a place to search for the work they want to copy.  See, e.g., 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d at 1159 (stating that 
Kazaa uses a supernode structure that has composite lists on computers dubbed 
“supernodes” and Grokster uses a de-cenentralized server which compiles lists of results 
from searches on the user’s own computer); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 
646-47 (describing Aimster’s system as functioning like a stock exchange, because it 
provides a forum for users to find and transfer digital files); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1011-12 (discussing Napster’s system as a central-indexing 
model in which the server held no files, but it did keep lists of the files available from 
users). 
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their customers, publishers attempted to impose liability on the 
manufacturers and operators of the new technologies or distribution 
systems.126
 
[29]  The Sony decision, however, stood as a formidable obstacle to the 
success of any suit against a manufacturer or operator of new technology.  
According to Sony, no liability can attach to any manufacturer or operator 
who employs a technology that is capable of substantial non-infringing use 
and who cannot control the use of the technology by consumers.127  
Therefore, to avoid being forced to go after individual users by imposing 
liability on the manufacturer or operator, publishers must either 
demonstrate that the manufacturer or operator could control the uses of the 
new technology or they must overturn or narrow the Sony decision. 
 
[30]  Publishers have pursued both of these avenues, achieving limited 
success in each.  First, publishers attempted to convince the judiciary to 
overturn, or at least narrow, the Sony decision.128  This effort met with 
some success, with courts interpreting the holding to require that a new 
technology be actually used for substantial non-infringing purposes, rather 
than merely capable of these uses.129  Thus, in In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation,130 the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction against the Aimster 
file-sharing service, because, in part, Aimster was unlikely to be able to 
show substantial non-infringing uses of its service.131   
 
[31]  Next, publishers achieved some success by arguing that operators of 
new technology have control over the uses of that technology.132  Two 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 645-46; Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d at 435-36; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 
1010-11; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F.Supp.2d at 997; Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 303; RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 
No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2000). 
127Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446-47, 456. 
128 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
129 See id. at 650-51 (“But the balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only in a case 
in which substantial noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are demonstrated.”). 
130 Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
131 Id. at 653. 
132 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1159 
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded by MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. 
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prominent cases displaying these arguments are A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc.133 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster 
Ltd.134  In Napster, the Ninth Circuit ordered the Napster file sharing 
service to remove all infringing files from its system.135  When Napster 
failed to comply with this order, the court ordered the service to be shut 
down until compliance could be achieved.136  Thus, the peer-to-peer file 
sharing technology employed by Napster was prohibited for both 
infringing and non-infringing uses and users.  In Grokster, however, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the defendant companies could not control the 
uses of their file-sharing technology.137  This technology was based on a 
different system than Napster, a decentralized system whereby Grokster 
was unable to prevent any particular files from being distributed.138  
Because of this lack of control, the Sony doctrine prevented the court from 
finding Grokster liable.139  In March of 2005, the recording industry 
appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.140  In the Court’s view, the Ninth 
Circuit “misapplied” Sony by reading that the case required that 
“whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can 
never be held contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of 
it….”141  Instead the Court held that the case was “significantly different” 
from Sony in that the distributors of Grokster, despite claiming 
noninfringing, alternative uses, “show[ed] a purpose to cause and profit 
from third-party acts of copyright infringement.”142  The Grokster Court 
                                                                                                                         
Ct. 2764 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
133 239 F.3d at 1004. 
134 380 F.3d at 1154. 
135  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027. 
136 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming the district court’s shut down order for failure to comply satisfactorily with the 
district court’s preliminary injunction). 
137 See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163-64 (holding that because the defendants were not 
access providers, did not provide storage or maintenance, and only communicated with 
users incidentally, their actions were “too incidental to any direct copyright infringement 
to constitute material contribution”). 
138 Id. at 1159-60, 1163-64. 
139 Id. at 1167. 
140 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
141 Id. at 2778.   
142 Id. at 2782.  In fact, Justice Breyer believed that “the need for modifying Sony (or for 
interpreting Sony’s standard more strictly) has not been shown.”  Id. at 2796 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
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held that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its 
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting 
acts of infringement by third parties.”143  The Court vacated the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider 
MGM’s summary judgment motion.144   
 
[32]  Finally, publishers have lobbied Congress for a legislative reversal of 
the Sony holding.145  One bill in particular, the Inducing Infringement of 
Copyrights Act of 2004,146 was specifically introduced in an effort to 
overturn the Sony decision.147  This bill, if enacted, would impose liability 
on any manufacturer or operator who encouraged consumers to commit 
copyright infringement by means of advertising the capability of the 
technology to perform infringement.148  The Induce Act would have 
specifically overruled Sony, because the Betamax was advertised149 as 
                                                 
143 Id. at 2770. 
144 Id. at 2783.   
145 See, e.g., Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. 
(2004) [hereinafter Induce Act]. 
146 Id. 
147 See, e.g., Letter from Ass’n of Am. Univ. et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick 
J. Leahy, Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 
17, 2004), available at http://www.educause.edu/LibraryDetailPage/666?ID=CSD3471 
(“The Copyright Office’s new draft fails to codify the Supreme Court’s Betamax 
decision, which, despite having fostered twenty years of explosive growth in technology, 
is now under unrelenting attack.”); Letter from Gary Shapiro, President of Consumer 
Electronics Ass’n, et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/10-6joint_letter_2.pdf (“Unfortunately, the 
recording industry continues to propose language that would not solve the piracy 
problems in the manner you identified, but instead would effectively put at risk all 
consumer electronics, information technology products, and Internet Products and 
services that aren’t designed to the industry’s liking.”); cf. 149 Cong. Rec. S7190 (daily 
ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Of course, the dysfunctional corrective 
mechanism that Sony proposed would have become problematic only if the Sony 
limitation was misunderstood or misapplied by lower courts.  Unfortunately, that has now 
happened.”). 
148 See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004); 
149 Cong. Rec. S7190 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Secondary 
liability should focus on intent to use indirect means to achieve illegal ends.”). 
149 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 
4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
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being able to copy copyrighted works.150  However, the bill was not 
enacted when introduced in Congress in 2004.  The pre-Grokster 
consensus was that the bill would be re-introduced, with a greater 
likelihood of passage, if the Supreme Court failed to overturn the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Grokster.151  Now, publishers are taking a wait-and-
see approach while the lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s 
Grokster ruling.152  Although the Supreme Court sidestepped Sony, the 
landmark case’s fate ultimately remains in the hands of Congress which 
may decide to legislatively overturn the ruling. 
 
2. Legislative Grants of Control to Publishers 
[33]  Publishers have also sought other methods of increasing their control 
over creative works and preventing any rise in the level of competition in 
copying or disseminating creative works.  These efforts have generally 
been in the form of lobbying Congress to create statutory protections for 
copyrighted works.  The success of these efforts can be demonstrated by 
                                                                                                                         
Liberties, and the Admin of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) 
(testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.) 
(“Now, these machines are advertised for one purpose in life.  Their only single mission, 
their primary mission is to copy copyrighted material that belongs to other people.”). 
150 If the bill were enacted, its breadth would depend on the interpretation given to it by 
courts.  What conduct is included is questionable at best.  For example, car manufacturers 
advertise their products as being able to accelerate from zero to sixty miles per hour and 
as having top speeds above the speed limits.  Would this constitute “inducement” of 
speeding and reckless driving?  The bill is so vague in its standards that it “has been 
ridiculed by techies as so poorly written that it could unintentionally ban an infinite range 
of everyday tools – iPods, DVD burners, even paper and pencil.” Xeni Jardin, Induce Act 
Draws Support, Venom, WIRED.COM, Sept. 11, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1294,64723,00.html.  See also Katie Dean, Big 
Anti-Induce Campaign Planned, WIRED.COM, Sept. 14, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,64870,00.html; Letter from Ass’n of Am. 
Univ. et al, supra note 148; Letter from Gary Shapiro, supra note 148. 
151 See Cindy Cohn & Phil Corwin, The Induce Act Would Give Hollywood Veto Power 
Over New Technologies, 1 SCITECH LAW. 9, 10 (2005) (“But Hollywood loves remakes, 
and the Act is sure to be back once the Supreme Court speaks on Grokster.”). 
152 Tony Newmyer, Caution Seen After Court Ruling, ROLL CALL, June 30, 2005, 
available at 2005 WLNR 10297448. 
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two statutes: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)153 and the 
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).154
 
 i. The DMCA 
 
[34]  One method by which publishers attempted to gain control over new 
technologies was by creating new technology of their own.155  The 
publisher’s technology, however, was designed to prevent users from 
engaging in unauthorized dissemination or copying of a copyrighted 
work.156  To achieve this goal, publishers designed technological systems 
which encrypted works or restricted access to works, so that consumers 
could either only use the works for specific uses or could only access the 
work through specific machines.157  These restrictions enabled publishers 
to control new technologies by requiring the new technologies to be 
compliant with the protection schemes created by the publishers.158  For 
example, to view Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs), a consumer must 
                                                 
153 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000). 
154 Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b), 102(d), 112 Stat. 2827-28 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 
304). 
155 See PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 270 (2003) (“While technology can make 
copying easier and less costly, it can also give content providers the means to more 
perfectly restrict access to materials.”); see also Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., An 
Unconstitutional Patent in Disguise: Did Congress Overstep Its Constitutional Authority 
in Adopting the Circumvention Prevention Provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 33, 51 (2002) (“[T]he ease of infringement and the 
difficulty of detection and enforcement would cause copyright owners to look to 
technological solutions, in addition to legal solutions, in order to protect their 
copyrightable works.”). 
156 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights 
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 49 (2001) (“Rights management 
systems . . . can insist that permission be sought, and a fee paid, for any use.”); see also 
BELLIA ET AL., supra note 155, at 270 (“[A]ccess to material on a web site can be 
conditioned on paying a fee and (absent hacking) perfectly enforced . . . .  [W]hile 
technology changes many of the assumptions underlying copyright law, it is far from 
clear whether such changes result in an expansion or contraction of control over 
content.”). 
157 See Burk & Cohen, supra note 156, at 50 (“[C]opyright owners determine the rules 
that are embedded into the technological controls.”); see also BELLIA ET AL., supra note 
155, at 270 (“For example, a copy-protected compact disc prevents a teacher from 
making a copy even if the copyright law might have deemed the copying a fair use.”). 
158 See generally Burk & Cohen, supra note 156. 
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purchase a DVD player that is capable of decoding the regional encoding 
on the disc.159  Furthermore, the player must be equipped with the ability 
to properly read and decipher the access codes on the disc.160  Finally, the 
disc itself must contain the proper access codes, or the player will not run 
it.161  Another example can be found in copy-protected compact discs.162  
These discs provide control over computer drives and CD players which 
can write to blank discs, by preventing these devices from copying 
protected discs – no matter what the purpose for copying the disc.163
 
[35]  The effectiveness of these technological developments by the 
publishing industry has been hampered by the emergence of what has been 
termed “the technological arms race.”164  Three groups of individuals have 
resisted the ability of publishers to technologically control their 
copyrighted works – would-be infringers, users of works which have 
fallen into the public domain, and fair users.165  None of these groups can 
achieve their desired use of the works if technology prevents unauthorized 
access or copying of the works.  Therefore, these groups responded to the 
publishers’ technological achievements by developing their own 
technologies which circumvent the publishers’ technologies.166  Thus, the 
publishers became embroiled in a battle of increasingly sophisticated 
technology.167
 
[36]  Publishers did not want to compete in this manner, so they lobbied 
Congress to provide statutory enforcement mechanisms for their 
                                                 
159 Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 
1, 26-29 (2002). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 21-23. 
163 Id. 
164 Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 
251 (“The problem with this scenario is that it constitutes a kind of wasteful ‘arms race’ 
of technological-protection schemes, with each side increasing its spending to outperform 
the other's technology.”). 
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technological protections.168  These efforts resulted in the enactment of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998.169  The DMCA is 
reminiscent of the grant given to the Stationer’s Company in the sixteenth 
century.  It provides publishers with a mechanism to enforce their 
exclusive rights to copyrighted works.  Under the DMCA, it is illegal to 
circumvent a technological lock on copyrighted works or to manufacture 
or distribute any device which is capable of this circumvention.170  With 
this statute as an enforcement mechanism, the publishers won the “arms 
race” – technologies which could defeat the publisher’s technologies are 
not legal.171   
 
[37]  The DMCA vastly reduces the potential for competition against 
publishers.  Any challenger who attempts to compete by using a new 
technology faces the serious barriers to entry imposed by the statute.  New 
technology is prohibited if it enables copying of copy-protected works, 
whether or not it also can be used for fair uses or to copy non-protected 
works or works which are protected but have fallen into the public 
domain.172  Because publishers use their concentrated power to obtain 
entire copyrights from authors, any new challenger must negotiate with 
the incumbent publishers for rights to any existing work.  Although 
challengers can compete to obtain copyrights on new works from the 
authors, they face numerous obstacles to sustained existence without 
access to existing works.  First, they will be disadvantaged in the 
competition for new works if they cannot copy or distribute existing 
works, because they can neither show their effectiveness nor rely on the 
                                                 
168  Under strong lobbying pressure from the middlemen, Congress… 
accepted the pay-per-access vision of the future and agreed to shore up 
copyright law to deal with the nuances of the digital environment. With 
the ostensible goal of bringing United States law into line with an 
international treaty, Congress enacted the DMCA. 
F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J. 293, 306 (2001). 
169 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000). 
170 Id. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), 1201(a)(2). 
171 See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 
428-30 (2003); see also Hardy, supra note 164, at 551 (defining the “arms race” 
concept). 
172 See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 155, at 270 (“For example, a copy-protected compact 
disc prevents a teacher from making a copy even if the copyright law might have deemed 
the copying a fair use.”); Sharp, supra note 159, at 26-29. 
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profitability from old works to support sales of new works.  Second, the 
incumbents could threaten to withdraw support from old works of authors 
if the author sells a copyright to a new copier or distributor.173  Finally, the 
challenger has no established popular works to draw in new works or 
customers.  Thus, the DMCA greatly diminishes the potential for 
competition in the publishing industries. 
 
 ii. The CTEA 
[38]  Since the beginning of the American system of copyright, publishers 
have periodically lobbied for extensions in the terms of duration of 
copyrights.174  The CTEA is the latest extension in this series.175  It 
extended the duration of copyright to the life of the author plus seventy 
years for works with a determinable author or authors or ninety-five years 
for institutional works.176  In a challenge to the CTEA, the Supreme Court 
has recently reaffirmed that extension of the duration is constitutional.177  
From a policy perspective, however, the wisdom of these extensions is 
questionable. 
 
[39]  The American system of copyright grants copyrights for “limited 
times” to provide a check on the monopoly power of copyright owners.178  
This check was designed in response to the abuse of monopoly power by 
publishers in England, and was intended to prevent a recurrence of the 
                                                 
173 This is similar to a tying theory in antitrust.  See Clayton Act § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000)); ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2003). 
174 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 
(extending copyright’s duration to a term of life of the author plus fifty years); Copyright 
Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (term of fifty-six years, 
consisting of an additional and a renewal term of twenty-eight years each); Copyright Act 
of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (term of forty-two years, consisting of an 
original term of twenty-eight years and a renewal term of fourteen years). 
175 See The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, §§ 102(b) , 
102(d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 (extending copyright’s term to life of the author plus seventy 
years). 
176 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
177 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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problems that monopoly created.179  The grant of a limited monopoly to 
authors was also provided as an incentive to create works in spite of the 
negative effects of giving exclusive control, not as a deliberate grant of 
control for the sake of giving control.180  In light of these purposes, the 
policy decision behind extending control over copyrights should be 
critically analyzed by Congress, because each extension increases the 
monopoly power of copyright holders, even if the duration is still 
technically for only a limited time.181  Because publishers are still able to 
obtain the entire copyright in a work from the authors, just as they did in 
seventeenth century England, the CTEA and similar previous statutes have 
periodically enhanced the monopoly power of the publishers. 
 
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLISHERS, AUTHORS,  
AND THE PUBLIC 
 
[40]  The lessons of history, the structure created by the Constitution, and 
the provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act all suggest a simple solution to 
the problem of publishers’ increasing ability to obtain monopoly power 
over creative works.  History suggests that monopoly power should be 
avoided and is of most concern when held by publishers.182  The structure 
of American copyright law in the Constitution suggests that the primary 
beneficiaries of the copyright law should be the consuming public, and 
that this benefit should be conferred indirectly by providing direct benefits 
to authors for making creative works.  Finally, the 1976 Act suggests that 
rights to works should vest initially in authors,183 a “copyright” should 
                                                 
179 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201 n.5 (“The Framers guarded against the future 
accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress 
to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”). 
180 Cf. id. 
181 See id. at 222 (“Beneath the façade of their inventive constitutional interpretation, 
petitioners forcefully urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the 
CTEA’s long terms.  The wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is not within our 
province to second guess.”). 
182 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201 n.5 (“The Framers 
guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and 
publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”). 
183 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
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consist of a bundle of individual rights,184 and each individual right should 
be separately transferable.185   
 
[41]  Putting these suggestions together, Congress should recognize an 
independent right within a copyright for each new technologically created 
method of distributing or copying a work.  These rights should initially 
vest in the author of the work no matter who owns the other rights to that 
work, and these rights should be transferable by the author to any party of 
his choosing – whether that party is an owner of some or all of the other 
rights in the copyright or not.  One caveat to this system is if another party 
owns all of the other rights which make up the copyright, that party’s 
original expectations in obtaining the copyright should be protected by 
granting it a right of first refusal to obtain ownership of the new right on 
the same terms as those offered by another potential transferee.  The rest 
of this section will explore the implications of this solution and discuss the 
importance of its implementation to stem the tide of the accrual of 
monopoly power by publishers. 
 
A. Benefits and Implications of This Solution 
[42]  This solution provides a substantial number of benefits, and it incurs 
few, if any, serious detriments.  Of the four interested groups, authors, 
publishers, the public, and technology inventors, three stand to gain from 
this solution.  The only one who does not stand to benefit, publishers, 
would at least still have their interests protected, although they would be 
unable to continue to reap rewards at the expense of the other groups.  The 
solution would also prevent monopoly, thereby respecting the lessons of 
history, and it would shift the balance of interests back into equilibrium 
for all parties. 
 
[43]  The first interested group that would benefit from this solution is 
authors.  Authors would benefit in a number of ways.  First, they would be 
the recipient of the newly created rights each time a new technology 
related to copying or distributing was developed, and therefore gain more 
control over their works.  This would give them increased control over 
where, when, how, and even whether their works are published, copied, 
                                                 
184 Id. § 201(d)(1). 
185 Id. § 201(d)(2). 
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and disseminated.  Second, this increased control would provide them with 
enhanced ability to receive compensation from their works, because they 
would have another right to sell.186  This new right corresponds to a new 
source of economic value.187  This right would be assignable separately 
from the other rights, either when created for existing works or when the 
author initially sells the works for works which are unpublished at the time 
of creation of the right.188  Third, authors would benefit from the removal 
of an intermediary in the distribution process.189  When the right is 
automatically assigned to a publisher who controls the copyright, the 
publisher typically does not enter into the operation of the new 
technology, but licenses that operation to one of its new challengers.  This 
system provides royalty payments to the publisher from the manufacturer 
or operator of the new technology, but it may not provide anything to the 
author.  If it does provide payments to the author, it likely only provides a 
portion of the royalties garnered by the publisher.  In laymen’s terms, the 
publisher takes a cut which would flow to the author if the author 
contracted directly with the manufacturer or operator of the new 
technology.  Finally, the author would benefit by receiving greater 
payments or royalty rates from publishers due to the increased competition 
among publishers and the new technology-driven challengers.190  These 
challengers would provide another avenue of copying and/or distribution 
to the author, so the author could choose to contract with the publishers or 
                                                 
186 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (recognizing that the right to 
include a freelance author’s manuscript in an online database is a separate right of the 
author’s, distinct from the right to publish in a magazine).  
187 Id at 497, 508. 
188 Id. at 497, 505. 
189 See Brian Keith Groemminger, Note, Personal Privacy on the Internet: Should It Be a 
Cyberspace Entitlement?, 36 IND. L. REV. 827, 832 (2003) (“The Internet also allows 
companies to efficiently deal directly with the ultimate consumer. As a result, a business 
can remove many or all of the distribution intermediaries from the chain of distribution, 
thereby reducing distribution costs to the business.”). 
190 See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448 (“Competition tends to increase economic 
efficiency and lower prices.”); Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often 
advance economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust 
laws. Free from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices, 
increases production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business 
dealing.”). 
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challengers.  This increase in competition should drive up the price 
obtainable by the author.191
 
[44]  The second group that would benefit is the public.  First, the public 
would benefit because this system would not destroy the publishing 
industries.  Publishers would still be able to realize profits on their 
activities, but there would be more incentive for authors to create works.  
Increased incentives for authors will assure that the number of new works 
is either increased or at least not reduced.  New works will still be 
available to the public.  Second, the public will benefit by virtue of the 
same benefits which flow from preventing monopoly power in the 
antitrust context: more sources for copying and distributing works, more 
competition amongst those sources, and lower prices.192  Generally, 
increased competition leads to lower prices and greater availability of 
products, which substantially benefits consumers.193  Third, the public 
would benefit from the continued availability of technologies which would 
otherwise be prohibited.194  Specifically, this benefits people who use 
these technologies for legitimate purposes.195  Finally, the public would 
benefit from the increased efficiency that comes with new technology that 
                                                 
191 See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448; Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325. 
192 See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 169-72 
(5th ed. 2003) (discussing consumer loss that results from monopoly overcharge). 
193 See supra note 190. 
194 Letter from Ass’n of Am. Univ. et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick J. Leahy, 
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 17, 
2004), available at http://www.educause.edu/LibraryDetailPage/666?ID=CSD3471 
(“The Copyright Office’s new draft fails to codify the Supreme Court’s Betamax 
decision, which, despite having fostered twenty years of explosive growth in technology, 
is now under unrelenting attack.”); Letter from Gary Shapiro, President of Consumer 
Electronics Ass’n, et al., to Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/10-6joint_letter_2.pdf (“Unfortunately, the 
recording industry continues to propose language that would not solve the piracy 
problems in the manner you identified, but instead would effectively put at risk all 
consumer electronics, information technology products, and Internet Products and 
services that aren’t designed to the industry’s liking.”). 
195 See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 155, at 270 (“For example, a copy-protected compact 
disc prevents a teacher from making a copy even if the copyright law might have deemed 
the copying a fair use.”); see generally, Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent 
Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 26-29 (2002). 
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is more efficient if the creator maintains control over the work rather than 
being forced to design the system to avoid maintaining control.  It 
removes the incentive for inventors to divest themselves of control in 
order to avoid secondary liability.196
 
[45]  Inventors and operators of new technologies would also benefit from 
this proposed solution.  These parties would be permitted to compete with 
established publishers and to realize a profit from their creations, instead 
of being forced to pay royalties or forego using their inventions.  They 
would be given incentives to continue to produce new technologies by 
realizing economic remuneration for their inventions.  They would be able 
to maintain control over their works, instead of being forced to pay 
royalties to publishers or abide by limitations on their creations imposed 
by the publishers.197  Finally, they would no longer be subject to a 
Hobson’s choice: either subjecting themselves to liability for copyright 
infringement or designing their inventions in an inefficient, suboptimal 
manner to avoid liability through a lack of control over users.198   
 
[46]  If authors had control over their own works, the incentive would shift 
towards maintaining control and creating an efficient system.  This shift 
would occur as a result of the effect on a number of components in the 
overall incentives provided to technology developers and operators.  More 
control by the developer or operator over the functioning of the system 
leads to a more centralized system, which leads to greater traffic by users 
at the centralized point of the system, and ultimately to increased profits to 
the operator or developer by charging higher prices to, and getting a 
greater number of, advertisers.199  Authors are more likely to be flexible 
                                                 
196 150 CONG. REC. S7178 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“A rule 
that punishes only control also acts as a ‘tech-mandate’ law: It mandates the use of 
technologies that avoid ‘control’ – regardless of whether they are suited for a particular 
task.”). 
197 See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. 
198 See 150 CONG. REC. S7190 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“A 
rule that punishes only control also acts as a ‘tech-mandate’ law: It mandates the use of 
technologies that avoid ‘control’ – regardless of whether they are suited for a particular 
task.”). 
199 See Eddan Elizafon Katz, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 58 (2001) (“First, content owners 
would lose significant advertising revenue from decreased website traffic as a result of 
users viewing their downloaded copies rather than streaming the content from the 
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with the remuneration structures of their works.200  Because authors 
receive benefits from both sales of copies of their works and from other 
sources,201 such as merchandise, tours, television appearances, or movie 
rights,202 they have greater incentives to allow new distribution 
technologies, in particular, to operate for minimal, or even zero, 
royalties.203  Even if authors do charge royalties, developers and operators 
would have the option of either paying those royalties out of their income 
from advertisements or by charging transaction fees for each download of 
that author’s work.  Finally, if an author did not grant rights to a particular 
                                                                                                                         
copyright owner's website each time they wanted to view it.”); Wei Yanliang & Feng 
Xiaoqing, Comments on Cyber Copyright Disputes in the People’s Republic of China: 
Maintaining the Status Quo While Expanding the Doctrine of Profit-Making Purposes, 7 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 149, 163 (2003) (“Commercial websites profit from news 
and news articles in two ways. First, the gratuitous service of providing online news and 
news articles boosts website traffic, thereby increasing advertisement revenue.”); Andrew 
L. Dahm, Note, Database Protection v. Deep Linking, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1076 (2004) 
(“Many online businesses derive revenue from advertising, so increasing the traffic to a 
website increases revenue”). 
200 For instance, many authors support free distribution of their work via peer-to-peer 
online services.  See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in the 
Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 11 (discussing both artists who approve and who 
disapprove of online peer-to-peer services and the recording industry’s response); 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF:  Let the Music Play, http://www.eff.org/share/ (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2005) (listing a number of artists who support online distribution of their 
works). 
201 This is an over-simplification.  Composers, for example, are artists, but they do not 
receive any benefit from sources other than copies sold.  Composers could, however, 
change their incentive structure through various means, such as contracting for a 
percentage of the profits of the recording artists, and they could also get compensation 
when their compositions are repeated in new works, such as movies. 
202 Of course, movie rights, translations, and other adaptations require the author to have 
kept those rights when he initially sold the copyright.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000 & 
Supp. 2002). 
203 See Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 473, 503 (2002) (“Most artists, if they are to earn any income at all, do so through 
performances and direct sales of CDs and merchandise.”); Lynn Morrow, The Recording 
Artist Agreement: Does It Empower or Enslave?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 42 
(2001) (“[A]n artist can generate further income from sources such as live performances, 
television appearances, books, merchandise, and, if the artist is also a songwriter, 
increased publishing royalties.”); David Nelson, Note, Free the Music: Rethinking the 
Role of Copyright in an Age of Digital Distribution, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 572 n.81 
(2005) (“Each additional download will provide an artist with the opportunity to sell their 
live shows and merchandise, the main source of income for most musicians.”). 
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developer or operator, that entity would have greater success preventing 
distribution on their systems of a limited number of authors’ works, as 
opposed to vast quantities of works.  Thus, this system would reduce the 
harmful incentive to produce inefficiency by decentralizing distributing 
systems. 
 
[47]  Publishers would not benefit from this solution, but they at least 
would not be harmed in regards to their pre-existing expectations.  By 
virtue of the right of first refusal, the publisher would be able to obtain the 
new right on terms no less favorable than those offered to its potential 
competitors.204  Therefore, the publisher would still have access to this 
right, so that its reliance in having all of the rights to a work when it 
purchased the copyright would not be undermined, but the author would 
still be able to obtain the competitive level of remuneration for that right.  
Additionally, publishers would be able to negotiate for the additional right 
in all future contracts. 
 
[48]  Finally, the copyright system as a whole would benefit from this 
solution.  The balance of power would shift back to an equilibrium point.  
Authors would continue to create new works and would have access to old 
works, the public would have new works available to purchase, publishers 
would be able to make a profit based on a competitive market, and new 
technologies would still be developed.  Publishers would no longer be able 
to quickly and easily gain monopoly power because they would face 
increased competition from new technology developers and operators.  
Publishers would also be forced to respond to new technologies, instead of 
fighting against them, which would lead to greater efficiency and 
competitiveness by the existing publishers.205
                                                 
204  A right of first refusal means that when the owners decide to sell the 
property, the person named has the first chance to buy it.  A right of 
first refusal or preemptive right does not give to the preemptioner the 
power to compel an unwilling owner to sell; it merely requires the 
owner, when and if he decides to sell, to offer the property first to the 
person entitled to the preemption. 
Willson v. Terry, 874 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Mont. 1994). 
205 See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448 (“Competition tends to increase economic 
efficiency and lower prices.”); Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often 
advance economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust 
laws. Free from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices, 
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B. Changing the Path of Copyright by Implementing this Solution 
[49]  The current course of copyright litigation and legislation shows a 
marked preference for promoting publisher control and power over 
copyrighted works.  Publishers are larger and more concentrated than 
authors, the public, or even technology developers.206  Therefore, they are 
able to require the transferal of copyrights from authors prior to agreeing 
to publish an author’s work.  This system has its benefits.  All parties to 
copyrights rely on and benefit each other in some way, so the continued 
vitality of publishers is important.  This does not mean, however, that 
publishers should be able to obtain monopoly power over copyrights.207 
Even worse would be a situation where publishers were assisted through 
public policy in obtaining monopolies. Yet, the current trend in copyright 
law seems to be headed in precisely this direction.  Congress has seen fit 
to continue to lengthen the duration of copyrights,208 and it has protected 
publisher actions designed to increase their control over works.209 
Congress has also contemplated legislative reversal of one of the largest 
obstacles to publisher acquisition of monopoly power.210  Courts too have 
demonstrated a preference for publishers, by narrowing the holding of the 
Sony case and by imposing liability on technology developers and 
                                                                                                                         
increases production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business 
dealing.”). 
206 See Marci A. Hamilton, Perspective on Direct Democracy: The People: The Least 
Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, *5 (1997) (“Granting copyright 
to authors was motivated by the understanding that publishers are more likely to become 
holders of concentrated power than are authors.”); Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing 
Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 44-45 (2002) (“[A]n increasingly 
concentrated industry of publishers routinely own the copyright for a work outright and 
therefore have an incentive to lobby for ever-expanding copyright terms.”). 
207 See Hawker, supra note 48, at 448 (“Competition tends to increase economic 
efficiency and lower prices.”); Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often 
advance economic efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust 
laws. Free from the restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices, 
increases production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business 
dealing.”). 
208 See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-
28 (1999) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304). 
209 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.L. 105-304, Title I, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 
2863 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201-1205 (2000)). 
210 See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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operators.  This pattern should be halted and reversed if an equitable 
balance of interests in copyrights and proper distribution of incentives are 
to be achieved. 
 
[50]  This solution effectively accomplishes these goals.  First, it would 
maintain the Sony decision, so technologies such as VCRs, DVD players, 
cassette players, and CD players would remain safe and legal.  However, 
if the current trend continues, the Induce Act will eventually be enacted, 
and these technologies will generate liability in their manufacturers.  This 
would harm not only the manufacturers, but also the consuming public, 
authors, and publishers themselves.  For example, in the VCR context, the 
home video industry has become huge, generating billions in profits every 
year.211  The video industry provides income to the publishers, to authors 
who sell copies of their works, and to the manufacturers of the electronics 
used to watch those copies.  It also benefits the public, by allowing them 
to watch movies and television in the comfort of their own homes and in a 
medium and at times other than just those provided by broadcast television 
or movie theaters.212
 
[51]  Second, this solution would transfer control to authors from 
publishers, and strike a more appropriate balance of the interests and 
incentives in copyright.213  Authors would be able to choose what uses of 
their works to permit and to withhold in relation to new technologies.  
Instead of this choice being given to publishers, who can use that choice to 
take over an infant industry in its inception, authors can utilize that 
nascent industry to enhance competition amongst publishers to the benefit 
of authors and the public alike.  For example, in the online peer-to-peer 
distribution systems, authors can choose whether to allow their works to 
be freely downloaded, to charge royalties for their works, or to withhold 
                                                 
211 See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004:Hearing on S.2560 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Gary J. Shapiro, President and 
Chief Exec. Officer, Consumer Electronics Association); Huver, supra note 118. 
212 Another example would be the application of the Induce Act to musical recordings 
and cassette and CD players. 
213 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 
2541 (1976); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003) (“The Framers guarded 
against the future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by 
authorizing Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”). 
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permission to download.214  Therefore, instead of allowing publishers to 
withhold permission across the board and to then enter the online 
distribution market themselves, it forces publishers to compete with the 
original online distributors.  Publishers would not be able to withhold 
rights from sources they do not control, such as Napster and Grokster, in 
an effort to promote sales from vendors who pay royalties to the publisher, 
regardless of the desires of authors or the ultimate effect on authors, 
publishers, technology developers, and the consuming public.215  Instead, 
authors would be able to choose whether, for what price (if any), and to 
whom permission to distribute their work online would be granted.  Artists 
who like the concept of Napster and Grokster could continue to 
disseminate their work via those services.  These services would only run 
into a problem with artists who refuse to permit online distribution of their 
works.216  For these authors, the services could either find a way to 
prevent downloading or face liability for infringement.  Both publishers 
and challengers would be able to operate online distribution programs, 
they would just be forced to compete for the rights to distribute each 
author’s works.  Authors would also still be able to impose liability on 
direct infringers, even if they failed to impose liability on an alleged 
secondary infringer. 
 
[52]  Finally, this system would enhance the ability of authors to recognize 
each individual right that composes the bundle of rights in a copyright. As 
the law currently stands, authors generally receive little, if any, additional 
benefit for each additional right conveyed to a publisher217 because the 
                                                 
214 See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in the Middle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 1 (discussing both artists who approve and who disapprove of 
online peer-to-peer services and the recording industry’s response); File-Sharing: It’s 
Music to our Ears, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/share 
(listing a number of artists who support online distribution of their works) (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2005). 
215 Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (recognizing a right in the artist to 
control the publication of his or her work in online databases). 
216 For artists who wanted royalty payments, the service could use a portion of its 
advertising revenues, even if it did not charge users for use of its services.  See, e.g., 
Artists Uncertain About File Sharing, CREATIVE LIBRARIAN, Sept. 17, 2003, 
http://creativelibrarian.com/364/artists-uncertain-about-file-sharing (providing examples 
of artists, such as Metallica, who do not want their files distributed for free). 
217 See generally, Mitchell, supra note 6 (discussing the publisher’s ability to require an 
author to transfer any newly recognized rights without any additional benefits); Amy 
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publisher has enough power to force the author to convey all rights in a 
work prior to agreeing to publish the work.218  If alternate sources were 
available to the author for selling the rights (i.e., if there was greater 
competition amongst publishers) the authors would have greater leverage 
for refusing to convey each right to a publisher.219  An author could rely 
on his ability to sell the individual distribution right to an online 
distributor and refuse to sell the entire bundle of rights to a publisher.  In 
essence, because the author could choose to distribute their work solely 
through the online distributor, the publisher would have less coercive 
power to obtain the entire copyright.220  Thus, authors would have greater 
leverage to negotiate with publishers and would thereby be able to receive 
greater remuneration, and increased incentives, for creating their works.221  
With the reward of additional compensation as an incentive, authors 
would create either the same number or possibly more works, which 
would be distributed to more consumers at the same or lower prices 
because of the increased competition amongst publishers and distributors.  
When one focuses on the direct benefit through copyrights to authors 
created by the Copyright Clause, the incentives to create new works 
emerge as the ultimate goal. Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary is the 
consuming public. This result appears to be the one mandated by the 
Constitution.222
 
                                                                                                                         
Terry, Note, Tasini Aftermath: The Consequences of the Freelancers’ Victory, 14 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 231, 236 (2004) (“The freelancers’ landmark victory in 
Tasini has proved to be empty of any actual concrete benefit to freelancers.”). 
218 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218 (1990) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 
14 (1909)) (“It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a 
publisher for a comparatively small sum.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 526-27 
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rights without any additional benefits); Terry, supra note 217, at 236 (“The freelancers’ 
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219 See Oettinger, supra note 48, at 325 (“Commentators often advance economic 
efficiency as the primary, if not exclusive, justification for antitrust laws. Free from the 
restraints of conspiracies and monopolies, competition lowers prices, increases 
production, and encourages innovation, consumer choice, and fair business dealing.”). 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003) (“The Framers guarded against 
the future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by authorizing 
Congress to vest copyrights only in ‘Authors.’”). 
 38
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 2 
[53]  If one focuses on the structure and language of the Copyright Clause, 
compensation to and incentives for publishers do not appear.  Instead, the 
direct benefit provided to authors causes the incentive to create new works 
to emerge as the immediate goal.  However, the limitations placed on 
authors' rights demonstrate that the ultimate beneficiary is meant to be the 
consuming public.  Thus, the result achieved by this solution---the 
provision of benefits to the public---appears to be the one mandated by the 
Constitution. 
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